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T HE course of development which rate regulation in general in this country passed through is well known. It may be 
briefly stated as follows : in the early cases it was held that 
when a state legislature prescribed a scale of maximum charges for 
a business affected with a public interest they substituted their will 
for the common law rule of reasonableness, and their determina-
tions were held final and conclusive. This view was gradually mod-
ified so as to place a limitation upon the power of the law-making 
body in accordance with the view that the "use and income of prop-
erty, as well as its title and poSS(!SSion" are protected by the Fifth 
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment against deprivation 
without due process of law.1 
Our problem is, more particularly, to trace in this development 
the changes in the relation of the federal an<;l state control over the 
subject. \i\That is the sphere of the federal power in this regard 
and how has it been divided from the state authority? For con-
venience of treatment we shall number the successive steps in the 
development of the constitutional law upon this manner of regu-
lation of interstate commerce. 
I. The first cases of rate regulation were upon the exercise of 
that power by a state over public service companies engaged in in-
terstate commerce but operating within one state, or, more prop-
erly, situated within a single state. The ruling was that, ''Their 
regulation was a thing of domestic concern, and certainly until Con-
gress acts in reference to their interstate relations the state may 
exercise all the powers of government over them, even though in 
so doing it may indirectly operate upon commerce outside its im-
mediate jurisdiction."2 This view was then adopted even in regard 
to transportation companies operating not within the confines of a 
single state, but across several states.3 The doctrine of these cases 
may be summarily stated as follows: that the states may fix rates 
for carriers on all intrastate shipments and such interstate ship-
ments as any of their citizens are parties to,-on these latter at 
least until Congress affirmatively intervenes.-i 
1 Brown, "Rate Regulation", pp. 193.5. 
•Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 135. 
3 Pcik v C. & N. W. Ry., 94 U. S. 174· 
•Brown: "Transportation Rates and Their Regulation", pp. 196-7. 
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2. This position was modified by the decision in Wabash Rail-
way v. Illinois,5 in which rate regulation was declared to be within 
that portion of the field of authority over interstate commerce which 
demanded uniformity of rule throughout the nation and where con-
sequently the silence of Congress gave no sanction for state con-
trol. Whether the action of the state imposes any actual restraint 
upon that national commerce is immaterial for the subject is beyond 
its jurisdiction. The· following year, however, Congress did actually 
occupy this portion of the field by the enactment of the Interstate 
Commerce Act, which among other things laid down certain rules 
about the making of rates on interstate shipments. Thus state action 
was constructively precluded. 
So far then the modification of the original doctrine had gone 
no farther than to restrict the control of rate-making by state leg-
islatures to shipments between points in the single state, leaving it 
supreme within its own boundari,es, apparently even to the extent 
.that interstate carriers might be compelled to carry intrastate traf-
fic at rates which, applied generally, might not yield a normal'retum6 
upon the total capital investment of the system. Incidentally it 
should be remarked that regulation of rates applies more particularly 
,to the transportation, to the act of exchange across state boundar-
ies, than to the parties who effect the exchange or conduct the 
transportation. But inasmuch as fed.era! incorporation is essentially 
a regulation of the participants in the commerce rather than the 
actual conduct of the interstate trade or the actual movement of 
objects of that commerce, itt is apparent that up.ti! the regulation 
extends beyond the control of rates for the interstate business of 
carriers to the control of the tariffs of interstate carriers as such 
the growth of the federal power can have only slight bearing upon 
our main inquiry. Until the federal regulation of rates so operates 
as to reach in and deal with the carrier as a business unit, it does 
not touch our problem so very closely. 
3. The next modification in the relation of the state control of 
rates to the national regulation came as a logical consequence of the 
doctrine that legislative authority cannot fix rates so low that they 
do not yield a reasonable return upon the property investment of 
the carrier,7 since this rests presumably not only upon the consti-
tutional guarantees of security of private property but also upon 
the constitutional incapacity of the states to place restraints upon 
interstate commerce. To the fine precision and nice symmetry of 
• u8 U. S. 557. 
e Ruggles v. Illi.sois, 108 U. S. 531. . 
1 C. M. & St. P. R;y. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418; Stone v. Farmers' Li:>an & Trust 
Co., u6 U. S. 306; Reagan v. Mercantile Trust Co., 154 U. S. 416. 
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
the previous stage of the law, whereby the state authority fixed rates 
on all shipments "wholly within the state" entirely exclusive of any 
federal interference, and the federal authority exercised complete 
control over rates on all interstate shipments,-to this arrangement 
there came a disturbing element. The ideal arrangement of "You 
stay on your side of the fence and I'll stay on mine," brought har-
mony only by separation. But since the interests were mutual the 
harmony based on separation could not endure. The disturb-
ance of the balance came about when a state fixed rates reasonable 
per se which yet were inconsistent with federal rates also reason-
able per se, in such wise that there came a discrimination in favor 
of state shippers. 
That such would be the outcome of a conflict between the rate-
making authorities was intimated in the Minnesota Rate Cases,8 
where it was said: "This is not to say that the nation may deal 
with the internal concerns of the state as such, but that the exer-
cise by Congress of its constitutional power to regulate commerce 
is not limited by the fact that the intrastate transactions may have 
become so interwoven therewith that the effective government of 
the former incidentally controls the latter. This conclusion nec-
essarily results from the supremacy of the ·national power within 
its appointed sphere." Nevertheless these cases were decided in 
favor of the power of a state commission to make any reasonable 
schedule of rates it chose to be effective within the state, even though 
the effect was to support the action of the commission in requiring 
intrastate rates which amounted to a discrimination in interstate 
commerce and thus made necessary a revision of interstate sched-
ules. 
But in an elaborate opinion justifying the powers exercised by the 
Minnesota Railroad Commission there is nowhere any implication 
that when Congress deems the interests of interstate traffic demand 
it, it may not occupy the entire field of control over interstate car-
riers in respect to their tariffs. And that this would be no usurpa-
tion of state power but only a legitimate exercise of its supreme 
control over the commercial development of the nation as a unit, 
becomes apparent when the vast power of the railroad transporta-
tion industry in determining the localization of industry and the 
distribution of industrial resources is considered. It is not difficult 
to imagine cases where under the law of this decision one section 
might have its commercial development delayed for years while an-
other section no more favorably endowed with resources and prac-
tically equidistant from their common metropolitan market might 
1 z30 U. S. 35z. 
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thrive prosperously. This is especially true so long as the Inter-
state Commerce Commission remains without power to fix minimum 
rates except insofar as it may forbid rebates and discriminations. 
Finally in the Shreveport case, Houston and Texas Railway 
v. Tlte United States,9 the intimation of the court in the Minnesota 
rate cases was brought to the test and it was affirmatively decided 
that Congress acting through its properly constituted agents could 
require an interstate carrier to disregard maximum intrastate rate 
schedules fo;ed by the state and reasonable in themselves when that 
federal authority ~etermined that such maximum rates were incon-
sistent with and so worked a discrimination against interstate ship-
ping.10 In the final decision Justice Hughes, speaking for the Su-
preme Court, said: 
"Wherever the interstate and intrastate transactions of 
carriers are so related that the government of the one in-
volves the control of the other, it is Congress and not the 
state that is entitled to prescribe the final and dominant rule, 
for otherwise Congress would be denied the exercise of its 
constitutional authority and the State, and not the Nation, 
would be supreme within the national field." 
The essential and fundamental fact11 to be gathered from the 
Shreveport case is simply this : that in the natural course of devel-
opment of regulation of rates on interstate commerce the Congres-
sional control was constrained to .go beyond dealing with the inter-
course as such, dealing with the rates of interstate commerce in 
rem, and found it necessary to deal directly in personam with the 
carrier.12 
Here is the large outstanding consideration. It was insufficient 
and ultimately impossible because contradictory to the attempt to give 
a dual personality to interstate carriers. Either they are the crea-
tures of many sovereigns, or they are the instrument of the whole . 
• 234 u. s. 342. 
10 This case was later followed in the Louisiana Class Rates decision (33 I. C. C. 
302); and in Ill. Cent. RR. v. Public Util. Co;,.mission, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 170. The de· 
cision of the South Dakota Rate Cases is shortly expected. 
11 As it was well put in the decision of the Interstate Commerce Commission in this 
case (23 I. C... C. 31, 39): "\Ve meet directly the most delicate problem arising under 
our dual system of government. Congress asserts its exclusive dominion over interstate 
commerce, the state asserts its absolute control over intrastate commerce * * * the effective 
exercise of its (the Commission's) power regarding interstate commerce makes necessary 
the assertion of the supreme authority of the national government. * * " Congress has 
clearly manifested its purpose to unite our railroads in a national system". 
12 A manner of regulation which some critics have believed to be beyond the power 
of Congress; and for that reason they have been unable to find a constitutional ground 
for the further power oi incorporation. See Prentice: Supra, 154-155. 
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
The fundamental contradiction in attempting to serve two masters 
could not be indefinitely suppressed. An arrangement which pro-
vided that one power should regulate some functions, and that an-
other power should regulate other functions led to an inevitable con-
flict.13 The carrier is after all one carrier and the essence of all 
regulation comes in the final analysis to control of the carrier rather 
than the transportation. 
In effect the Interstate Commerce Commission finally had to 
come to say to the interstate carrier: "We are regulating you, not 
one of your functions. or part of your actions. What you do in 
one situation affects your entire conduct. The rates you charge 
in intrastate business exercise the profoundest influence upon the 
course of development of the national commerce and industry. Now 
the interests of national commerce are supreme ; they are not sub-
servient to any local trade. Moreover the authority of the national 
government where it conflicts with state authority is supreme. Hence 
your first allegiance, your primary duty is to the federal regulatory 
power14 in all your actions whatsoever, wholly within one state or 
covering several states." The situation obviously contained the 
potential elements of a uniform central control over the rates of 
interstate transportation companies. By the passage of the Act of 
March I, 1918, that which was potential has become real. The 
whole subject of the control of interstate carriers has taken on a 
new aspect. Whether this Act comes under the war power of Con-
gress or the commerce power is not immediately to the point. In 
a general way it may be stated that the entire subject of rate-mak-
ing has been transferred to the Federal power.15 Henceforth an 
issue may arise between the United States Railroad Administra#on 
as an· arm of the Executive and the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion as an arm of Congress respecting the exercise of this all-im-
portant regulatory power, but it would seem that the issue between 
the state q.nd national control is dead. General Order Number 28 
of the -Director General of Railways issued May 25th, 1918, and 
amended June 12th, 1918, provides a revised tariff and rate schedule 
which applies to ·both interstate and intrastate shipments. So far as 
the writer is aware the validity of this order has not ·been called in 
question. ' 
13 Our belligerent necessities have forced this fact upon our consideration. We have 
now come to recognize that it is essential to the efficient operation of our railways that 
they be treated as one system. · 
14 See the remarks of even such a conservative critic as Mr. Calvert upon the opin· 
Ion in N. Y. C. R. R. Co. v. I. C. C., 200 U. S. 361 in his "Regulation of Commerce", 
p. 158. 
lll See special article in the (N. Y.) Journal of Commerce for June 19, 1918, page 6. 
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By the Act of March 2, 1893,1° Congress required that automatic 
couplers should be placed upon all cars and locomotives used in 
interstate transportation. This was a measure having as its chief 
object the minimizing of the danger to those engaged in handling 
trains in interstate traffic. Previous to its enactment the states 
alone had exercised their police power to protect those engaged in 
moving railway trains whatever the character of the tra,ffic.17 The 
leading cases which arose under the act were Chicago, Milwaukee 
and St. Paul Railway Company v. Voelker18 and Johnson v. South-
ern Pacific Company?-9 In both cases it was held that "cars" in 
actual use in interstate shipment or transportation did not cease to 
come within the purview of the statute by reason of their temporary 
stop upon a siding. The court said in the latter case: "Differen-
tiating this from other cases is "the distinction between merchan-
dise which may become an article of interstate commerce or may 
not, and an instrument regularly used in moving interstate com-
merce, which has stopped temporarily in making its trip between 
two points in different states * * * *" It is a manifest infer-
ence from the argument of the court that it would have been in-
clined to regard other cars engaged solely in transporting an in-
trastate shipment over the same interstate road as beyond the scope 
of the act. 
It became apparent from these and other cases under the act 
that such a restricted seope for the remedial legislation was bound 
to defeat its purpose. Much vexatious litigation was bound to arise 
to determine both the rule and facts in regard to when a car was 
actually engaged in interstate commerce. For this reason20 the Act 
of 190321 was passed extending the terms of the previous act so 
that all interstate railway carriers ipso facto were required to equip 
their cars with automatic couplers which would be so uniform as 1n 
no case to require a man to go between the cars to be coupled. It 
was decided in Soitthern Railway Company v. The United Statesi2 
that the requirement of automatic couplers on all cars and brake 
wheels on all locomotives "of any railroad engaged" in interstate 
transportation, regardless of the character of the particular traffic 
of any given train or the shipment in any given car, was a valid. 
regulation by Congress for the promotion of safety in interstate 
2o 27 Statutes 531. 
11 Thomas v. Georgia Railroad and Banking Co., 38 Ga. 222; Njus v. Chicago, Mil· 
waukce & St. Paul Railway Co., 47 Minn. 92. 
" 129 Fed. 522. 
10 196 U.S. I. 
"'Congressional Record, 571h Cong., Vol. 35, p. 7300; Vol. ;:6, p. 2268. 
21 32 Statutes 943. 
22 222 u. s. :20. 
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commerce. Finally in Southern Railway Company v. Indiana23 an 
even stronger constru_ction was resorted to in maintaining the para-
mount power of Congress in the face of state regulations. In this 
case the car upon which the company had failed to provide secure 
hand-holds was engaged exclusively in an intrastate haul. There was 
an Indiana statute providing penalties for failure to have such 
equipment upon cars used in intrastate transportation. N everthe-
less the court held the company was not subject to this police regu-
lation of the state even on such domestic shipments. The Safety 
Appliance Act was held valid because "the equipment of cars mov-
ing on interstate roads was a regulation of interstate commerce." 
Thus here again, as in the matter of rates, the national authority 
has found it necessary for an effectual exercise of its control over 
interstate commerce to go behind the intrastate transactions or 
operations of the interstate railway company and deal directly with 
the carrier as a unit, or in personam. 
The relation of interstate carriers to employees like the relations 
of employment in most other industries remained outside the con-
cern of the law-making bodies24 until the grievances of the labor-
ing class became scandalous. Sordid working conditions, long hours, 
and industrial ~ependence finally aroused the public conscience, 25 
and in the last decade of the last century began a widespread move-
ment for remedial social legislation. Naturally the first action 
taken in a national way was a bungling attempt to impose and en-
force harmony rather than constructively to improve specific con-
ditions. This took the shape of a Congressional regulation of the 
dealings of interstate carriers with trade unions in the 10th Sec-
tion of the Act of June r, r898, known as the Erdman Act. This 
Act drawn as a sequel26 to the Chicago Railroad strike of r8g4 had 
for its object the elimination of friction between employees and 
employers and the averting of open ruptures on such a scale as 
might interrupt interstate commerce. 
The provisions for arbitration of disputes have been upheld and 
frequently taken advantage of, but the roth Section making unlaw-
ful any discrimination against an employee because of his mem-
bership in a labor organization was declared unconstitutional in 
23 236 u. s. 439. 
"' "The habit of our people, accentuated by our system of representative government, 
is not so much in legislation to anticipate problems as it is to deal with them after 
experience has shown them to exist". Justice Moody in dissenting opinion, Employers' 
Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 523. 
25 Alger: "The Old Law and the New Order'', pp. 237-261. 
20 H. Rep. 454, ssth Congress, 2nd Session. 
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Adair v. The United States.27 But as the decision went upon an en-
tirely different point from that with which we are concerned, it 
does not call for specific attention. It cannot be said to have affected 
either one way or the other the relative extent of the federal and 
state control over the carrier. For the clear and unmistakable im-
port of the decision was upon the discriminative character of the 
regulation28-not the matter of the regulation as such. The most 
significant legislation by which Congress has sought to interpose 
its authority in the relation of employment is the law on employers' 
liability. The Act of June II, 1906, was the entering wedge for 
this sort of regulation. The constitutionality of the act was con-
tested in the cases lmown as The Employers' Liability Cases.29 It 
was an unfortunate fact that the cases were poorly argued. Coun-
sel for plaintiff in error practically conceded the chief point in issue 
when the whole force of their argument was expended in support 
of that interpretation of the act which would make it apply, in spite 
of its general wording, only to employees injured while actually 
engaged in interstate transportation. Their argument was not ad-
dressed to the support of the obvious intent of the law, which was 
clearly the matter which the court was required to adjudicate and 
of which they were entitled to the benefit of a full argument at the 
bar.30 There was slight reference to the virtual necessity of uni-
formity in order to protect "inter.state employees." Unless this 
pressure of liability upon the employer to guard against accidents 
to its employees be uniform, however, the object of Congress to 
provide greater safety in the interstate service will be only imper-
fectly and unsatisfactorily advanced. 
The court held that the act was unconstitutional inasmuch as by 
its wording it was intended to apply to "any" employees of inter-
state carriers, as well those engaged in intrastate operations as 
those engaged in interstate operations. The court took the view 
that the relations of interstate carriers to the former class of em-
ployees was a subject exclusively within the province of state action. 
And the main ground upon which the court rested its decision must 
be admitted to have very cogent reasons behind it. The valid rea-
soning would seem to be that the connection between the safety of 
interstate transportation operations and also the security of goods 
:rt 208 u. s. 160. 
""See particularly 208 U. S. 179 • 
.. 207 u. s. 463. 
ao The argument for plaintiff in error was unduly influenced by the facts of their 
particular case, where the injured employees were actually engaged in interstate trans· 
portation. The brief filed by the Attorney General by permission of the court while 
arguin'l' the point in issue more fully was far from exhausting the arguments which 
woul~ appear most powerful for the constitutionality of the law. 
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which are subject matter of interstate shipments, and the liability 
which the employer bears to its "intrastate employees" is not suf-
ficiently close or intimate to warrant the regulation by Congress of 
the latter. This is in full recognition of the principle that in the 
exercise of its regulatory power over interstate transportation and 
the carriers engaged therein the action of Congress cannot be ob-
structed by the indirect and collateral effect upon the intrastate 
business and relations of such carriers, since in the case presented, 
it would not operate as a substantial obstruction or impediment to 
its control over those carriers in their interstate business and rela-
tions to deny the application of its regulations beyond this primary 
field. 
Notwithstanding this ruling and the subsequent Act of Congress 
not inconsistent with it and the opinion stated in the cases31 where 
this later Act was upheld, the Supreme Court has been bound by 
circumstances to go beyond this strictly confined rule. In the case 
of Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Behrens32 the court refused 
to hold the carrier liable under the federal liability act for the injury 
to a fireman on a switch engine doing switching work entirely within 
the city of New Orleans but engaged indiscriminately in the trans-
fer of cars in both interstate and intrastate commerce. At the time 
of the accident the switch engine was hauling only intrastate cars. 
But the court took occasion to lay down the following principle, 
which is significant evidence of the trend of its opinion: 
"Considering the status of the railroad as a highway for 
both inter~tate and intrastate commerce, the interdependence 
of the two classes of traffic in point of movement and 
safety, the practical difficulty in separating or dividing the 
work of the switching crew; and the nature and extent of the 
power confided to Congress by the commerce clause of the 
Constitution, we entertain ho doubt that the liability of the 
crew in the course of its general work was subject to regu-
lation by Congress whether the particular service being per-
formed at the time of the injury, isolatedly considered, was 
in interstate or intrastate commerce." 
Finally this rule was actually applied and enforced in New York 
Central Railroad v. Carr33 where the interstate carrier was held lia-
ble for the injury to a brakeman on a "pick-up" train running be-
11223 U. $. I • 
.. 233 u. s. 473. 
33 238 u .. s. 260. 
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tween two points within a single· state and made up of cars in both 
intrastate and interstate traffic, and although at the time of the 
injury the brakeman was engaged in cutting off two intrastate cars 
from the engine on a siding. There is thus a clear trend of deci-
sions modifying the original principle as laid down in the first 
Employers' Liability Cases, and this trend is evidently in the direc-
tion of enlarging the scope of the application of the federal regula-
tion on this subject. 
In still another important way Congress has exercised its regu-
latory power in regard to the relations of employment on inter-
state railroads. The Act of March 4, 1907, prescribed the maximum 
working hours per day for which an interstate carrier might em-
ploy a person working on interstate traffic. In Baltimore and Ohio 
Railroad v. Interstate Commerce Conimission3 i this law was up-
held. Though in principle it goes no further than the Employers' 
Liability Cases, in its practical operation it involved a much more 
extensive interference with the relations of the employer with the 
employee engaged solely in intrastate traffic. The hours of service 
which represent the legally permissible maximum in interstate trans-
portation must necessarily to a great degree govern the hours of 
service in the intrastate business. The standard length of run being 
worked out, the establishment of division points and large switch-
ing and transfer yards, will tend to make the profitable hours 
of employment those fixed by federal law. In Erie Railroad v. New 
Y ork35 it was held that a telegraph operator of an interstate car-
rier was subject to the hours-of-service law of Congress and not 
of the state, even though some of the trains he was engaged in 
"spacing" and "reporting'' were purely intrastate. 
There .is no e:l;.i:ension36 of the principle of these cases by the 
much-heralded Adamson Act, September 3, 1916, and the decision 
of March 19, 1917, upholding it. Only the subject matter of the 
law, i. e. wag-es, differs, if indeed .that proposition can be firmly 
established, a point upon which the court itself was not clear. By 
the express terms of the act it is applicable solely to those "actually 
engaged in any capacity in the operation of trains used for the 
transportation of persons or property" in interstate commerce. Thus 
like the foregoing cases under this head the regulation deals not with 
the interstate carrier as such, a body corporate engaged in interstate 
commerce, but only with such phases of a business as are clearly 
interstate in character. 
"221 U. S. 612. Followed in Northern Pacific Railway v. Washington, 222 TJ. S. 370. 
as 233 U. S. 671, followed in Denver I. Ry. Co. v. U. S., 236 Fed. 685 • 
.. The decision is none the less decidedly importan: as regards the status in con· 
stitutional law of subjects arising under the 5th and 14th Amendments. 
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Upon the subject of the relations of interstate carriers to ship-
pers the most sigriificant question has been the regulation of the lia-
bility of the former for damage to shipments. For many years the 
railroads upon all phases of their traffic were held subject to the 
common law rule, that a common carrier was practically an insurer 
of goods, though this was later modified to the extent that a carrier 
could by contract exempt himself from certain liabilities not includ-
ing liability for his own negligence. It was held in Hart v. Penn-
sylvania31 that a fair contract limiting the extent of recovery to an 
agreed valuation of the property would be enforced. :Many states 
(including New York, Iowa, et al.) hence sought by statute to re-
affirm the old common law rule. 
It was such a statute which declared that the liability of the r.ul-
road company would remain as it was at common law, regardless 
of any contract whatever, that formed the matter of contention in 
Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paitl Railway v. Solan.38 In that case 
the court decided that such a state regulation was not only a Yalid 
interference with the contracting powers of private parties but was 
applicable to interstate shipments arising in the state where such 
law was in force. The court declared: 
"It is in the law of the state that prov1s1ons are to be 
found concerning the rights and duties of common carriers 
* * * *, and the measures by which injuries resulting 
from their failure to perform their obligations may be pre-
vented or redressed." 
This is an extreme statement of the power of the states to make 
regulations concerning interstate cominerce. There is no rr,ention, 
even, of a dormant power in Congress to legislate upon such a 
matter, the court, indeed. going so far as to assert: "It is in no just 
sense a regulation of commerce." 
In Pennsylvania Railroad Company v. Hughes,39 however, the 
court took a more compromising attitude. Upon an interstate ship-
ment originating in New York where a carrier might limit his lia-
bility to a stipulated sum it was held that the damage occurring in 
Pennsylvania where common carriers might not so limit their lia-
bilities rendered the railroad company liable under the law of 
Pennsylvania to the full extent of the injury. Thus, in spite of the 
conflicting character of the state laws and the obviously unjust 
ST II.2 U. S. 331 • 
.. ,1;9 u. s. 133 • 
•• 191 u. s. 477· 
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burden thereby placed upon interstate commerce. the court conti•1-
ued to give effect to state laws governing liability upon interstate 
shipments. Nevertheless the court took occasion to remark that 
such features of transactions involving interstate commerce could 
not be regarded as beyond the regulatory power of Congress wl1en 
it should choose to exercise it. 
Finally, the enactment of the Carmack Amendment to the Hep-
burn Act in r9o6 settled the matter of regulation of liability of car-
riers of interstate commerce as we have already noticed in con-
nection with telegraph companies. As the court said in Kc.11sas 
Soitthern Railway v. Carr40 
"The amendment undoubtedly manifested the purpose of 
Congress to bring contracts for interstate shipments under 
one uniform rule of law, and, therefore, withdraw them 
from the influence of state regulation."41 
Other questions having to do with the relations of shipper and 
carrier, have been in regard to supplying facilities for transporta-
tion, such as cars and sidings, and charges and penalties for demur-
rage including failure to give notice to consingee of arrival of freight, 
as well as failure to dispose of freight reasonably after it has reached 
its destination. It will be sufficient to mention some of the recent 
cases covering these matters. In Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific 
Railway Company v. Hardwick Company,42 it was held that the 
Hepburn Act operated to exclude all state regulations penalizing 
interstate carriers for failure to furnish cars to shippers for use in 
interstate traffic. This case was followed and the principle con-
firmed in Yazoo and Mississippi Valley Railroad Company v. Green-
wood.43 Similarly in St. Lottis, Iron Mountain and Soitthern Rail-
way v. Edwards44 an Arkansas statute imposing liability upon 
carriers for failure to notify a consignee of the arrival of ship-
ments, whether of an interstate or intrastate character, was held 
unconstitutional. The Hepburn Act said the court, "by its very 
terms embraces the obligation of a carrier to deliver to the con-
•• 227 u. s. 639. 
"'Other cases upholding this statute and its exclusive authority are: Atlantic Coast 
Lille v. Ri11erside Mills, 219 U. S. 186: Chicago, etc. Railway v. Miller, 226 U. S. 513: 
Galveston, H. etc. Railway Co. v. TVailace, 223 U. S. 481; Norfolk & Western Railway 
Co. v. Dixie Tobacco Co., 228 U. S. 593; 1'fisso11ri, Kansas and Te:ras Railway Co. v. 
Harriman, 227 U. S. 657; :Missouri, Kansas and Te:ras Railway Co. v. Harris. 234 U. S. 
412, where a state statute providing for an attorney's fee in cases of recoverable con· 
tested claims for damages, was sustained, in no way impinges on this rule • 
•• 226 u. s. 426. 
43 227 1J. S. I • 
•• 227 u. s. 265. 
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signee, and therefore by the same token excludes the right of a 
state to penalize on that subject." . 
In Illinois Central Railroad v. Mulberry Hill Coal Company45 
there was, however, a curious reversion from the rule laid down 
explicitly in the Hardwick case above. In this case it was held 
that the federal regulation as enacted in the Hepburn act was not 
exclusive but might be supplemented by state statutes fixing lia-
bility upon "Carriers for failure to perform their common law duty 
of providing cars within a reasonable time. This decision and the 
one in Pennsylvania Railroad v. Puritan Coal Company46 to similar 
effect are quite inexplicable in view of the trend of the court's 
decisions upon like points and its previous decision in the Hardwick 
case. In fact the court refused to attempt to reconcile that case, 
on the ground that the question of the effect of the federal regula-
tion was not brought up in the state courts. But certainly that gives 
no just basis for refusal to rule where the effect of the decisions in 
the state courts is to give effect to a statute which is admitted to 
operate where the state's power of regulation has been held by the 
Supreme Court itself to be excluded. · 
We come thus to the conclusion that the regulation of interstate 
carriers has shown a sustained tendency to devolve more and more 
vitally upon the federal authority. The trend of decisions of the 
Supreme Court has been to confine in a more and more limited 
sphere the power of the states to direct the operations of these in-
struments of a national commerce. Finally, at least for the dura-
tion of the war, the Federal Government has taken unto itself 
their exclusive control, and in debarring the states from all power 
to regulate them it has encountered no opposition. 
PERSONS AND BUSINESS UNITS 
That a state cannot impose discriminative burdens upon the acts 
of trade within its jurisdiction of citizens of another state has long 
been the recognized rule.47 Nor have such decisions rested upon 
the constitutional inhibition48 upon the states which prevents them 
from granting privileges and immunities to citizens of the one state 
not open to citizens of all the states ;49 rather they rest upon the 
positive grant of power to Congress to regulate t~ade among the 
•• 238 u. s. 275 • 
•• 237 u. s. 121. 
n Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275; Walling v. Michigan, u6 U. S.· 446; Robbins 
v. Shelby Con.pan~·, 120 U. S. 489; Fargo v. Michigan, 1.:n U. S. 230. And it applies 
even to Congress. Cf. The Stoutenburgh Case, 129 U. S. 141. 
"Article IV, Section 2. 
••An exception is Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418. 
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states. By a curious inversion of reasoning, however, corporations 
were denied the protection of this rule, since in cases involving the 
discrimination against them the court argued not from the exclu-
sive power of Congress to regulate commerce among the states as 
it had with individuals, but instead from the above-mentioned "com-
ity clause" under which corporations were very justly held not to be 
"citizens" within the meaning of that section. Hence they have 
always been and are now admitted to do business in other states 
than their parent state only by comity. Notwithstanding this fact 
it has been held50 beyond the power of a state to discriminate by 
statute in favor of its own citizens in respect to their legal rights 
and liabilities toward a foreign corporation to which the state has 
granted permission there to conduct its business. 
But the regulatory power of Congress over commerce came into 
active exercise in respect tq the persons negotiating interstate 
commerce only by the passage of the Sherman Act of 1890. This 
act constitutes the most general way in which Congress has exer-
cised its power to regulate the national commerce. It is a com-
plete prohibition of monopolies and combinations in restraint of 
trade, though considered by many merely an enactment into federal 
statute of the rules of the common law. It was aimed at the sup-
pression of monopoly over any branch of the commerce moving 
between the states. The terms of the act were very general and 
it has thus imposed upon the courts the duty of interpretation and 
"selective application" to an uncommon degree. 
The constitutionality of the act has been repeatedly affirmed,n 
and it only remains to consider briefly the development of the law 
as an effective instrument of a federal policy for the control of the 
industrial evolution of the nation. In short, it is not an answer to 
the question of what forms of monopoly or restraint of trade are 
covered by the act52 that we shall seek, but only the question in how 
large a field does it operate. 
Now the very first decision under the act, the Sugar Trust case, 
held that the law was not applicable to manufacturing combinations, 
or producing monopolies, but only to "commerce." Such business 
oo Blalu v. McC/ung, 172 l,;. S. 239. 
"'The 'stock' cases are: E. C. Knight Company C•lSe, 156 U. S. 1; l\Iontag:ie v. 
1.c>wry, 193 U. S. 38; Trans-Mo. Freig?1t Ass'n Case, 16'5 U. S. 290; Joint Traffic Ass'n 
Case, 171 U. S. 505; Hopkins v. U. S. 171 U. S. 578;Addystone Pipe Co. Case, 175 U. 
S. 211; Cnmw//y v. V'nion Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540; Barber Paving Cnmpa.ry v. Field, 
194 U. S. 618; Loeu·e v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274; Northern Securities Case, 193 U. S. 
197; The Standard Oil Case, 221 U. S. l; The American Tobacco Case, 221 U. S. 106. 
n An excellent review and discussion of the law and the facts up<'n this subject 
from this point of view will be found in a series of three articles in The Journal of 
Political Economy, XXIII, 3, 4, 5, by Professor A. A. Young. 
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dealings and forms and methods of organization as related to man-
ufacture were considered antecedent to interstate commerce, wholly 
a concern of the state, and subject solely to its control. This dis-
tinction has a certain nice logical consistency and would seem on 
purely a priori grounds to be incontestable. Its ~tatement in the 
opinion of the court has considerable forcefulness, and show of 
reason, considered as an abstract proposition. 
Fur,UR, C. J., declared: 
"Doubtless the power to control the manufacture of a 
given thing involves, in a certain sense. the control of its 
disposition, but this ·is a secondary and not the primary 
sense; and although the exercise of that power may result 
in bringing the operation of commerce into play it does not 
control it and affects it only incidentally and indirectly. Com-
mer~e succeeds to manufacture and is not a part of it." 
But when the facts of modern business are brought into view, 
as the facts of that very case show, the proposition sounds hollow 
and meaningless. The combination of the sugar refineries effectu-
ating as the court itself stated "nearly complete control of the manu-
facture of refined sugar in the United States" operated to "restrain 
trade" and bring about a monopoly price for sugar all over the 
United States no less efficaciously because all of the refineries com-
bining happened to be located in Philadelphia, than if each refinery 
had been located in a separate state. 
Passing over the many cases which bridge the gap53 of thirteen 
years which separated this decision from that of the Danbury Hat-
ters' Case, we come at once to the consideration of the opinion in 
that important case. The real issue in that case does not seem to 
the writer to be what it has been generally described as being, 
namely, whether the Sherman Act was applicable to labor organi-
zations. Or at least, if that was the issue as it was treated by the 
court, it really involved a larger issue, namely, whether the power of 
Congress in the regulation of interstate commerce extended beyond 
the mere action by which goods were put in transit ·across state lines 
and reached the transactions leading up to that stage in the process 
where sale and transportation begin. It seems to me that no other 
63 A good example of an attempted application of the Knight case principle is in 
D11eber Watch Company v. Howard Watch Company, SS Fed. 8s'r, 66 Fed. 637 in the 
opinions of which one finds several striking anomalies. The contention to the same 
effect was made the chief defense in the Addystone Pipe Case and was most aptly an· 
swered by Judge Tait in his opinion, 8s Fed. Rep., z94-99. In re Debs (tS8 U. S. s64) 
also may be taken as an evidence of the changing mind of the court although in its cpin· 
ion in that case the conrt refused to rest its decision upon the. Sherman Act. 
FEDERAL INCORPORATION 253 
interpretation can be put upon that decision, relative to our inquiry, 
than that the force of imperative circumstances had finally come to 
make the court accede to the validity of the operation of the federal 
power beyond the rigid limits laid down in the Knight case. If it 
be the rule of that case that the conditions surrounding and the 
dealings affecting the manufacture of all goods whatsoever are 
solely within the competency of the states to countenance or correct 
no matter what the "incidental and indirect" consequences upon the 
interstate trade, then certainly that can no longer be said to be the 
authoritative rule after the decision in Loewe v. Lawlor. 
But, if dealings between employers and employees in regard to 
the manner in which shops shall be conducted come within the con-
trol of Congress simply by virture of the fact that goods produced 
in those shops eventually reach the channels of interstate commerce 
it is difficult to understand why the respective rights and powers 
and equities of shareholders, bondholders, etc., of a corporation con-
ducting such a shop are not also within the competency of Con-
gress to regulate. But leaving aside all analogies and ulterior com-
parisons for the moment it is indubitable upon any fair considera-
tion of this case that the Supreme Court has determined that the 
federal law against monopolies and combinations in restraint of 
trade among the states has a wider scope than it was at first dis-
posed to hold-that in effect it extends to actions which relate to 
those aspects or stages of industry which ordinarily or at least his-
torically have been deemed within the province of state regulation 
whenever such actions operate, even though it be only by their in-
direct and secondary consequences, to the material injury or inter-
ruption of the commerce which is interstate and of national concern. 
The state of the law upon this subject particularly so far as it 
affects labor organizations has been thrown into considerable con-
fusion by the subsequent legislation of Congress known as the 
Clayton Act. But the principle which we have pointed out as the 
essential one for which the Danbury Hatters' case stands would 
seem not to have 'been impaired or endangered by any recent 
decisions. 
SUBSTANCE OR OBJECTS 
In regard to the substance which forms the basis of interstate 
transactions, of the commodities the movement of which make up 
interstate commerce, the field for long remained free and unre-
stricted. Whatever lawful property was trafficked in by private 
contract across state lines was deemed a legitimate article of com-
merce. Private contract rather than public law determined what 
should be and what should not be the subject matter of interstate 
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commerce. So clearly was this view established that a state might 
not even prevent the introduction within its borders of such a com-
modity as intoxicating liquor"' of which by a lawful and reason-
able exercise of its police power to protect the health and morals 
of its citizens it had prohibited the manufacture or sale within its 
borders. In other cases a state law prohibiting the sale within the 
state of meat from any animals slaughtered without having been 
inspected and certified by state authorities,55 and a state-wide pro-
hibition of the manufacture or sale of oleomargarine56 were held to 
be unconstitutional interferences with interstate commerce. In 
short, the pathways of interstate commerce were by rule of con-
struction rath~r than by positive law kept absolutely open. 
It will be apparent thus far that it is settled doctrine that the 
power to determine what shall be the subject matter of interstate 
commerce rests exclusively with Congress.57 The real question is 
not whether the state may exercise any control over such a sub-
ject but of what is the extent of the federal power. Is the fed-
eral government confined or restricted in the determination of what 
shall be the lawful subject matter of interstate commerce to strictly 
police regulations designed to protect the physical health or moral 
welfare of the nation? Or does its authority extend to measures 
having to do with broad principles of public policy? So far it must 
be admitted the power of Congress has never been exercised beyond 
the first sphere. A consideration of the extent to which the national 
regulatory power has gone in making positive police regulations may 
throw some light on the tendency in this direction. For the re-
markable extension of what is legally included under the police 
"'Such was the doctrine of Bowman v. Railway Company, 125 U. S. 465, and of 
Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100. The ruling in Mug/er v. Kansas was in nowise incon· 
sistent with this doctrine; see particularly 123 U. S. 674 . 
""Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313. 
""Scho//enberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 1. Respecting the ludicrous contest of 
powerful interests over the introduction of this innocent commodity it was later held in 
McCray v. United States (195 U. S. 27) that an Act of Congress (32 Stat. 93) imposing 
a prohibitive tax on artificially colored oleomargarine was a valid exercise of its taxing 
power. But with the development of the law of taxation we are not here concerned. 
01 It should not be overlooked, of course, that the power of the state to require in· 
spection of articles offered for sale in the state whether imported or of domestic pro· 
duction has never been denied. But this is confined to specific articles cf a larger 
class. No class of goods or merchandise which Congress has recognized as articles of 
interstate commerce may he excluded but only particular specimens in an impure con-
dition likely to have a deleterious effect upon the public health or specimens 30 made 
or in such form as to deceive and defraud the public. But even this power may only 
he exercised relative to goods moving in interstate commerce in the absence of inspection 
laws by the national government covering che •ame subject or where uniformity of regu· 
lation is imperative. ~ee Plumley v. Mass., 155 U. S. 462; Compagnie Francaise v. Bd. 
nf Health, 186 D. S. 380; Globe Elevator Co. v. Andrew, 156 Fed. 664; Train v. Disin· 
fecting Co, 144 Mass. 523; Neilson v. Garza, Fed. Cases No. 10,091. 
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power as possessed by the several states is a familiar fact to care-
ful students of law~8 and sociology whose perspective covers the last 
three-quarters of· a century. of our development. We shall consider 
in order the federal laws on liquors, food and drugs, live-stock, 
lottery tickets and gambling devices, and "white slavery." 
Spurred by the unpopularity of the decision in Leisy v. Hardin 
Congress on August 8. l8go, passed the Wilson Act by which it 
voluntarily relinquished its protection of the free movement of in-
toxicating liquors in interstate commerce. Thereafter it was heldb9 
unlawful to manufacture liquors within a state having a prohibition 
law even entirely for sale without the state as well as to bring such 
liquors within the state for resale even in original packages. So 
rested the law until the passage of the Webb-Kenyon Act of March 
l, 1913. By that act it was made unlawful to ship across state 
boundaries any intoxicating liquor intended for use in the state in 
which it is received in violation of any laws there subsisting. Con-
gress has thus absolutely forbidden the shipment in interstate com-
merce under certain circumstances of an article which the Supreme 
Court had judicially determined to be a lawful article60 of com-
merce. And in upholding the law61 the Court went even further, 
stating. "It is not * · * * * disputed that if Congress had pro-
hibited the shipment of all intoxicants in the channels of interstate 
commerce * * * such action would have been lawful." 
The basis of the regulation and inspection of the production of 
food and drugs to be shipped in interstate commerce is the Act of 
June 30th, 1906. There have been noteworthy. amendments in 
1907, 1908 and 1912. In the Hippolite Egg case,62 the first impor-
tant decision under the act, it was held that any "adulterated" arti-
cle shipped in the channels of interstate commerce whether intended 
for sale or whether intended for use only as a raw material in an-
other and consumable product was subject to seizure and con-
demnation in original unbroken packages by federal authority. But 
the case of Savage v. Jones63 appears to have settled the doctrine 
that the power of Congress in making regulations to prevent the 
movement in interstatt: commerce of impure and unhealthful com-
""Ely, "Property and Contract, etc.", Pt. II, Chap. V and Append. IV. Orth, "The 
Relation of Govt. to Property and Industry", various articles, pp. 49·178; Freund, "Con· 
stitutional Limitations and Labor Legislation", and articles by others in Proceedings of 
the Third Annual Meeting of the American Ass'n for Labor Legislatfon (1909) • 
.. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545. 
"'Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. xoo. 
"' Clark Distilling Co. v. Railway Co., 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 180 • 
.. 220 u. s. 45. 
"'225 u. s. 501. 
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modities does not exclude similar action by the states6"' upon the 
same goods even before they have become inextricably commin-
gled with the common property of the state. In that instance, how-
ever, the Act only forbade misbranding so that the statute which 
required the affixing of the exact formula to the article was really 
supplemental to the federal regulation. The provisions of the law 
requiring brands and labels to be placed upon the packages in-
tended to reach the purchaser were upheld in a subsequent decision65 
invalidating a state law forbidding all labels other than the one it 
prescribed. It appears then to be the settled doctrine that while 
the Pure Food and Drugs Act is not exclusive of state regulations 
upon the same subject nevertheless these latter must not interfere 
with the enforcement of the federal regulations66 which presum-
ably might be made so complete that additional regulation by a state 
would constitute a burden upon interstate commerce and so be pre-
cluded altogether. 
The federal government has taken action to enforce its pure food 
laws by inspection during the process of production in a single in-
dustry, meat packing. The validity of this regulation67 has not, I 
believe, been questioned before the Supreme Court. The federal 
police regulation covering the interstate commerce in live stock had 
its inception in the Animal Industry Act of May 29, 1884. Pre-
vious to the enactment of this act as a measure of protection to the 
stock-raising industry of the state the Legislature of Missouri had 
passed a law forbidding the bringing into the state of any cattle 
from the Southwest between March and November of any year. 
This statute being held invalid68 as a prohibition during eight 
months of every year of interstate commerce in cattle regardless of 
their condition, a profitable and legitimate industry was left with-
out adequate police protection. The ruling was distinctly favorable 
to the national authority, but it brought manifest responsibilities. 
It was for the discharge of these that the Bureau of Animal In-
dustry was established. Its findings, however in regard to the means 
of guarding against disease and its spread among domestic animals 
were little more than recommendations to state authorities. The Act 
"'To the same effect is Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U. S. 52. 
00 McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U. S. n5. 
""The Shirley Amendment of August 23, 1912, passed after the decision in United 
States v. Jo/1nson which construed the "misbranding" forbidden to apply only to state· 
ments of contents may be referred to as evidencing the extension of the national regula-
tions. The Amendment making it illegal to misrepresent ihe curative effect of drugs 
was upheld in Seven Cases v. United States, 239 U. S. 510. 
01 In U. S. v. Lewis (235 U. S. 282) the penalty provided f.or effacement of a label 
of the government inspector was enforced. 
08 Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465. 
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forbade the transportation between states of any live stock known to 
be infected with a communicable disease; but the principal service 
rendered was in providing that the Bureau ascertain through its 
agents the existence of contagious disease in any locality and notify 
thereof shippers and transportation companies. 
Nevertheless the state authorities were not bound to recognize 
the findings of the Bureau or act in conformity with its recommen-
dations. 69 Moreover state laws providing' additional police protec-
tion70 against the introduction of diseased cattle were held not to be 
excluded by the federal regulations. In order to facilitate the inter-
state traffic in live-stock which was becoming seriously hampered 
by these divergent state regulations, Congress on February 2, 1903, 
passed an act providing that a certificate from an inspector of the 
Bureau of Animal Industry to the effect that specified live stock 
had been found free from communicable disease entitled the owner 
to ship them into any state without further inspection. 
In Asbell v. Kansas_71 a conviction under a state law requiring 
inspection by an agent of the federal Bureau or in the alternative 
by a state official was sustained. So long as Congress refrains 
from passing an act requiring inspection of all cattle transported 
or driven across state lines from sections from which communica· 
ble or other diseases are likely to be carried into other sections or 
refrains from requiring inspection even of all cattle transported in 
interstate commerce during certain periods of the year, neither of 
which is inconceivable,72 so long will such state regulations as that 
of Kansas be upheld. Meanwhile it is sufficient for our purpose to 
note that the federal regulation is supreme and the •state require-
ments so far as they affect interstate movement of stock are only 
provisionally valid. 
By the Act of March 2, 1895, the interstate carriage of lottery 
tickets was prohibited and by the act of February 8, 1897, that of 
obscene literature and articles designed to prevent conception was 
also forbidden. The contention was made in the case testing the 
first of these acts, The Lottery Case,13 that the regulatory power 
of Congress did not extend to the prohibition of commerce in any 
line. This contention was also made in United States v. Popper,14 a 
case arising under the latter act. But the answer of the court given 
in the Lottery Case was: "We should hesitate long before adjudg-
.. Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137. 
•° Kimmish v. Ball, 129 U. S. 217; l'tf. K. & T. Ry. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613. 
T.I 209 u. s. 251. 
72 See Calvert: Op. cit., p. 149. 
"13 188 u. s. 321. 
u 98 Fed. 423. 
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ing that an evil of such appalling character carried on through 
interstate commerce cannot be met and crushed by the only power 
competent to that end. We say competent to that end because Con-
gress alone has the power to occupy, by legislation, the whole field 
of interstate commerce." 
Finally, for the suppression of prostitution Congress has exer-
cised its power to regulate interstate commerce by police measures, 
and this in a drastic way. After the adverse decision of Keller v. 
The United States75 upon the 3rd Section of the Act of February 
20, 1907, which related solely to aliens, Congress again asserted its 
power by the Act of June 25, 1910, commonly known as the Mann 
Act. This is noteworthy for our particular purpose, also, because 
it deals directly with persons as such. In a way it sets up certain 
standards and prescribes certain qualifications for those who secure 
interstate transportation services. It demands inquiry into the mo-
tives and conduct of those who engage interstate transportation 
a matter quite distinct from the inspection and regulation of the 
subject matter of such transportation. 
The constitutionality of the act was first questioned in a prose-
cution before a United States District Court-United States v. 
W estman.76 It was there upheld. It was examined at greater length 
in United States v. H oke.77 The manner in which the court phrased 
its question makes the opinion of special value, in connection with 
our own inquiry. It was as follows: "Has Congress under its 
regulatory powers the right in any case to prohibit commerce be-
tween the states?" The answer was that it had.78 Upon appeal be-
fore the Supreme Court79 it was urged that it was a right and privi-
lege of a person to move freely between states. Moreover it was 
contended that the motive or intention of those engaging interstate 
transportation did not constitute a matter within the regulatory 
.power of Congress over interstate commerce, but the court up-
holding the law replied to this: "It urges a right exercised in mor-
ality to sustain a right to be exercised in immorality * * * * 
This constitutes the supreme fallacy. * * * * The States may 
.,. 213 U. S. 138. See, however, the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes for 
a clear presentation of the comprehensiveness of the Congressional authority. 
•• 182 Fed. 1017. 
" 187 Fed. 992. 
'"The statement has been made by a justice of the Court: "I had supposed the Con-
stitution of the United States had established absolute free trade among the states of 
the Union". (Mr. Justice Harlan in a dissenting opinion, New York v. Rob~rts, 171 
U. S. 658, 680); but it has never been so held. The Constitution nowhere inhibits 
Congress irom placing restraints upon interstate commerce, whenever in its discretion 
such restrictions are deemed expedient, providing they are not inconsistent with other 
constitutional provisions, e. eg., Art. V of Amend . 
.. 227 u. s. 308. 
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control the immoralities of its citizens; but there is a domain which 
the states cannot reach and over which Congress alone has power; 
and if such power be exerted to control what the states cannot 
it is an argument for-not against-its validity." Finally, in Cam-
inetti v. U1ii.ted States/-0 the act was given an even broader and 
more vital interpretation. In that case it was held that the procur-
ing of transportation even when unaccompanied by expectation of 
pecuniary gain was condemned by the act. 
It is the manifest contribution of the few decisions under this 
act that they emphasize the principle that upon the subjects falling 
within the sphere of its constitutional powers the police power of the 
national government is not to be distinguished from the police power 
of the states. It has the same source-it is inherent in the idea of 
sovereignty over a designated field of action. It is limited by sub-
stantially the same constitutional principles, and extended by the 
same forces of an expanding social and industrial life. The fact 
that as yet the federal power of police regulation has not been 
pushed to the application of such broad principles of public pol-
icy, has not become the servant of so modern a social philosophy,-
that fact has nothing to say upon the existence of the latent author-
ity, which the Supreme Court in each succeeding case seems to rec-
ognize more definitely. 
What then are the conclusions to be drawn from this comprehen-
sive though necessarily cursory review of the development of the 
commerce power of Congress? As a broad generalization, I take it 
there can be no objection to stating that there has been an expan-
sion of the national regulating power fitting to the expansion of the 
national commerce and the widening of the markets. Our consti-
tutional system has on the whole proven itself capable of spon-
taneous adaptation,!!l to the economic growth of the nation, and 
worthy of our continuing confidence. This conclusion furnishes 
a basis for our Judgment concerning the constitutional validity of a 
national incorporation law; that if the enactment of such a law is 
backed by a fair proportion of the business community (and there 
seems every reason to believe that it would even now have the sup-
port of a representative group of men82 in ·business and professional 
80 37 Sup. Court, Rep. 192. 
81 Alger: "The Old Law and the New Order", pp. 149-179. 
82 Morawitz: "The Power of Congress to Enact Incorporation Laws, etc.", Harvard 
Law Review, June, 1913. The Journal of Accountancy manifested the interest of the 
accounting profession in such legislation by printing in its issue of February, 1910, the 
full text of the law then proposed by the Administration, and by devoting its editorial 
columns to the discussion thereof. 
American Bar Association: Report of Committee on Commercial Law, 1887, pp. 1.z-13. 
Commercial Law League of America: Proceedings at West Baden, Indiana, 1904. 
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life), and if Congress by its first action evidences a disposition to 
promote the interstate trade, rather than to harry and retard it, 
the Supreme Court would be diligent to find its way clear to uphold 
it. And as I trust to have shown it would not need to make any 
radical departure from the letter and spirit of its adjudication of 
past cases in justifying such an exertion of power by Congress. 
MYRON w. WATKINS. 
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